

# The Pronoun "I" as a Subject of Self- and Self-as-the-Other-Reference

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1. The reflexive loop: "The "I" is the one who says "I" (Benveniste, 1966) identifies and simultaneously transforms the real person, the I-speaker, into an object of a language, the pronoun "I", therefore logical-semantic and lingual-semiotic operations may be extrapolated on this object. The real speaker can exist only in the actual world. Still, a chain of intermediate speakers (indexes) is built between him and a text, and the "appropriation" of a language (in the Benvenistean terms) is assigned to these indexes. It becomes possible to move the "I" to other worlds, times, and loci, as well as to establish close to metaphorical and metonymic relations between the "I" of an actual speaker and referentially different semiotic "I"-s of an utterance. The pronoun "I" is an indication of a speaker and a key mechanism for self-, meta- and other-description and correlation of an utterance with its actual and potential contexts.

2. By logical-semantic and semantic-syntactic analysis of language, it can be demonstrated that a splitting of referentially different "I" may occur in different modal contexts. The most significant distinction by status can be described as a distinction between the performative self and the descriptive self, that is between the "I" who speaks (describes) and the "I" about whom speaks the first "I". (Ross's performative hypothesis – Ross 1970). In addition, it is possible to distinguish between metonymic "I"-s (preserving substantive identity in differing worlds; < I<sub>1</sub> am speaking here and now > I<sub>2</sub> may not be here now - two "I" are the same selves, but the first is located in the actual world-context, and the second self is transposed to some imaginary world) and metaphorical I-s (substantively differently selves replacing each other in relation to different worlds-contexts: ) "If I were you, I hate myself" – cf. Lakoff 1996 ), It is also productive to distinguish between actual and possible contexts in which different, including imaginary "I"-s act as a speaker (various versions of 2-D semantics, - D. Kaplan, D. Lewis, Stalnaker, Chalmers), esp. when in literary works, when a narrator is located in an imaginary world (Lewis, 1979 ). On other grounds, different, in some situations, mismatched "I" are also distinguished in cognitive models (G. Lakoff), describing the splitting of "I" into Subject and Personality (Self) or into observer and participant. (Lakof 1970)

3. These data lead to the conclusion that the formulation of Emile Benveniste should be supplemented by the formula that was suggested by the originator of the second-order cybernetics Heinz von Foerster: "The reflexive personal pronoun" "I" appears as the indefinitely applied recursive operator, ... or in words: "I am the observed relation between myself and observing myself." (1981, p. 268). The different meanings and uses of this pronoun reflect various forms of communication between the "I" as the obligatory agent of speaking and observing and the "I" as the object of description and observation. This described "I" in turn, can be both an agent and an object of an action. Within the language system, a distinction is created between internal and external references, each of which has its own semiotic (imaginary) "I"-agents (see Niclas Luhmann's systemic theory).

4. There are various "I" -s, arising in the process of transition from the speaker-substance to semiotic "speaking entities", determining an interaction between utterances and contexts. This indicates that intermediate subsystems-interfaces arise between language and speech, between utterance and context. As a result, the "I" as the interface between text, language and context may be split into different in its status "I"-s, each of which is a key point of the corresponding subsystem of reference and description.

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